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JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND ISSUE ADVERTISING: A TWO STATE
STUDY
Christopher Terry & Mitchell T. Bard
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court curbed Congress’s ability to limit
campaign finance in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n.1 The Citizens
United decision immediately set off a debate over the underlying principle
of the decision; namely, can money become a corrupting force in politics
during a political campaign?2 Justice Kennedy’s opinion rejected the notion
that campaign donations were potential sources of corruption in most cases.
Writing for the majority, the court held that not only did “few if any contributions to candidates . . . involve quid pro quo arrangements,”3 but that “independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”4
Justice Stevens, in a lengthy dissent, painted a different picture, arguing “[t]he Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the nation.”5 He goes on to argue, “[t]he legislative and judicial proceedings relating to BCRA generated a substantial body of evidence
suggesting that, as corporations grew more and more adept at crafting ‘issue
ads’ to help or harm a particular candidate, these nominally independent
expenditures began to corrupt the political process in a very direct sense.
The sponsors of these ads were routinely granted special access after the
campaign was over.”6
Just a year earlier, Justice Kennedy had taken a different view when
examining the potential of outside advertising in judicial races. In Caperton
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1. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010).
2. Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens United, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 2365, 2367 (2010).
3. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356–58.
4. Id. at 357.
5. Id. at 396.
6. Id. at 454–55.
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v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,7 Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in a
5-4 decision, which held a plaintiff’s due process rights were violated under
the 14th Amendment when a state supreme court justice failed to recuse
himself in an appeal where he received more than $3 million in campaign
donations from the chief executive officer (CEO) of the defendant corporation in the matter.8 In fact, evidence pointed to the CEO raising money for
the judicial candidate with the knowledge that the judge would eventually
hear an appeal on this case.9
Justice Kennedy found, based on two prior Court decisions, the responsibility of judges to recuse themselves went beyond the traditional common
law standard of a judge having a direct financial interest in a party.10 Instead,
he wrote, citing Withrow v. Larkin,11 that recusal was necessary when “the
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker is too
high to be constitutionally tolerable.”12
In Caperton, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s petition for recusal on
four different occasions; the plaintiff argued he did not have to step down
from the case absent objective evidence of bias.13 Justice Kennedy rejected
this argument, holding that “there is a serious risk of actual bias—based on
objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person with a personal stake
in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election
campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”14
Justice Kennedy noted the $3 million donation to the judge by the defendant’s CEO was more than all of the judge’s other donations combined,
and that the timing of the donations reflected an effort to influence the very
case for which the recusal was sought.15 The Court found that while judges
would not always have to recuse themselves when they received campaign
contributions from parties to a suit, in this case, the “extreme facts” meant
that there was a “probability of actual bias,” which rose “to an unconstitutional level.”16
It should be noted that Justice Kennedy took pains to describe the facts
in Caperton as “an extraordinary situation where the Constitution requires
recusal.”17 Nevertheless, he accepted the proposition that a presumption of a
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
Id. at 873–74.
Id. at 873.
Id. at 877–79.
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975).
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 877(quoting Winthrop v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
Id. at 882.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 884–85.
Id. at 886–87.
Id. at 887.

2017]

JUDICIAL ELECTIONS & ISSUE ADVERTISING

581

likelihood of bias could be created by campaign contributions to a judge
from a party to a lawsuit.18
In this paper, we continue to explore the relationship between outside
groups and judicial candidates, a relationship we argue should not be taken
lightly. In two earlier articles,19 the authors examined non-candidate issue
advertisements on Milwaukee radio stations to empirically examine whether
any changes in the employment of the advertisements or the ads themselves
were visible during the times of the changes in campaign finance law
brought about by the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (BCRA) and the Citizens United decision. We found close correlations
between the changes in the law and the number of entities buying issue advertisements, the amount of money spent, and the number of candidate mentions made in the advertisements.20 In a third article, we expanded our analysis to include issue advertising during judicial elections in Wisconsin.21 Using our previous research as a starting point, here we examine the judicial
advertising during elections in the spring of 2016 in two states, Wisconsin
and Arkansas. Part II examines the Supreme Court’s requirement for quid
pro quo corruption to limit independent political spending, and Part III
summarizes the state of political advertising and the law. We lay out our
research questions and method in Part IV, as we look for potential influence
on judicial elections in Arkansas and Wisconsin, and we lay out the results
of our inquiry in Part V. Part VI discusses the meaning of the results, while
we sum up the findings and offer thoughts on how to move forward in Part
VII.
II. RECUSAL AND QUID PRO QUO CORRUPTION
Past research has shown that there is a demonstrable correlation between donations to justices in Wisconsin and favorable rulings in favor of
campaign supporters in more than 50 percent of cases. 22 Additionally, an
18. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884.
19. Christopher Terry & Mitchell T. Bard, Citizens United, Issue Ads, and Radio: An
Empirical Analysis, 20 COMM. L. CONSPECTUS 307 (2012) [hereinafter Empirical Analysis];
Christopher Terry & Mitchell T. Bard, Milwaukee Radio Public File Data, 1998-2011: An
Empirical Analysis of Issue Advertising After the BCRA and Citizens United, 24(1) U. OF
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 157 (2013) [hereinafter Milwaukee Radio].
20. Milwaukee Radio, supra note 19.
21. Christopher Terry & Mitchell T. Bard, An Opening for Quid Pro Quo Corruption?
An Empirical Analysis of Issue Advertising in Wisconsin Judicial Races Before and After
Citizens United, 16 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 305 (2015).
22. Wisconsin Supreme Court Justices Tend to Favor Attorney Donors (Oct. 20, 2013),
http://www.wisconsinwatch.org/2013/10/20/wisconsin-supreme-court-justices-tend-to-favorattorney-donors/ (“[i]n instances where a contribution came in before a case was decided,
justices favored those attorneys’ clients 59 percent of the time.”).
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analysis of the Wisconsin State Supreme Court revealed that the justices
failed to recuse themselves in at least 98 percent of cases in which one or
more of the participants have donated to one or more of the justices’ election
campaigns.23 As a result, an empirical examination of issue advertisements
in races for judges, where the potential for something approaching Justice
Kennedy’s quid pro quo benchmark for corruption is great, provides an important opportunity for a focused, empirical inquiry.
In the matter of judicial elections, to empirically examine the effect of
issue advertising, we need to examine the third-party spending—freed by
the decisions in Citizens United (dealing with the content of issue advertising) and McCutcheon v. FEC (which dealt with spending limits).24 Issue
advertising made up the bulk of campaign spending in Wisconsin judicial
races during our initial period of study.25 While the relationship between
outside groups and candidates for political office is subject to some debate,
the potential for outside groups to influence an election in favor of a friendly
judicial candidate increases the potential for corruption substantially, which
Justice Kennedy recognized in Caperton.26
So far, the Supreme Court majority has limited the government interest
in regulating campaign contributions to the narrow area of “quid pro quo
arrangements.”27 That is, unless a donor receives an agreed-upon benefit in
exchange for a contribution, the donation cannot rise to the level of being a
corruptive influence sufficient to justify congressional regulation of the free
speech rights of a corporation, union, or other entity providing campaign
money.28 For the current Supreme Court to uphold any limitation on campaign finance, the government will need to be able to demonstrate that the
law in question limits quid pro quo corruption. General influence of the type
Justice Stevens was concerned with in his Citizens United dissent will not
suffice.
Our previous Wisconsin-based research demonstrated that prior to Citizens United, the only non-candidate political ads mentioning a judicial candidate at any level between 1998 and 2009 were a series of spots run in 2006
encouraging people to support the confirmation of Justice Samuel Alito’s
23. Id.
24. See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
25. Terry & Bard, supra note 14.
26. See supra note 14.
27. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 355.
28. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L.
Rev. 1425, 1455 (2015). Stephanopoulos argues that with the Supreme Court limiting the
government’s interest in preventing corruption to quid pro quo arrangements, campaign finance reform legislation will need to rely on government interests beyond preventing corruption. He proposes the interest in ensuring that public policy aligns with the wishes of the
electorate.
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nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court.29 Given the completeness of the archive we were working from, we interpreted this as indication that issue
advertising in judicial elections was limited.30 While the archive contained
entries for candidate advertising in several local and state-level judicial elections, the public file data suggests that issue groups had only become involved in judicial elections after the changes to the electioneering communication standards in the Citizens United decision.31 The removal by Citizens
United of the limits as to when issue ads could mention candidates appears
to have played a substantial role in introducing third-party advertisements to
judicial races.
While issue advertising in judicial races in Wisconsin was limited prior
to Citizens United, our previous research supports the conclusion that the
decision had a powerful effect on advertising in judicial races in Wisconsin,
opening the door for third-party groups to make significant investments in
ads attacking one candidate and/or supporting another.32 The quantity of
issue advertising exploded in the 2011 Wisconsin supreme court race in the
first full year after Citizens United after more than a decade of no issue ads
being run in judicial elections in Wisconsin.33 Without the changes in the
law brought about by the decision, many of the issue ads (including all of
the judicial ads, which identified the candidates within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a general election) run in 2011 would not have been
permissible under federal law and/or the station’s policies.34 Just two years
later, in 2013, during the next statewide judicial race, there was more advertising by outside groups than by both of the candidates combined.35 As such,
the media debate (which, clearly, looms large in shaping the overall debate
in a race) in the judicial election was not primarily set by the candidates, but
was in the hands of outside groups.
The environment for potential quid pro quo corruption in this arrangement became a reality during a series of the legal challenges to the John Doe
investigation of illegal campaign coordination during Governor Scott Walker’s recall election.36 Outside groups implicated in the investigation had
29. See Milwaukee Radio, supra note 19.
30. Id.
31. Terry & Bard, supra note 13. A check of the data we had for other in-market stations
in our study of issue advertising changes between 2006 and 2010 also supports the finding
that outside groups were not purchasing issue ads for judicial elections prior to Citizens United.
32. See Milwaukee Radio, supra note 19.
33. See Terry & Bard, supra note 21.
34. See Empirical Analysis, supra note 19.
35. Terry & Bard, supra note 21.
36. Although the legal wrangling around the John Doe investigation of Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker was largely secret and sealed, a leak of key documents was reported on by
The Guardian, including requests for at least two of the Wisconsin Supreme Court Judges to
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spent significant amounts of money on issue advertising during both political and judicial elections in Wisconsin before becoming parties to a lawsuit
that ultimately halted the investigation of their allegedly illegal campaign
activities.37
III. POLITICAL ADVERTISING AND THE LAW
Political advertising in broadcasting is divided into two major categories. Campaign advertising, advertising that originates with the official campaign of a legally qualified candidate, is governed by rules contained within
sections 312/315 of the Communications Act of 1934.38 Provisions within
the Act require broadcasters to carry campaign advertisements from candidates for federal office, provide equal opportunity to advertising by opposing candidates upon request, and to offer advertisement availability to a
candidate at the lowest unit rate.39
The second category of political advertising, non-candidate political
advertising (often referred to simply as “issue ads”), covers any other advertising that discusses a political issue. Non-candidate political advertising
does not originate from the official campaign of a candidate for office. Instead, the advertising comes from outside parties such as individuals, unions, corporations, or even political parties. One of the provisions of the
BCRA that was invalidated by Citizens United is the limits on “electioneering communications,”40 a standard which prevented issue ads from identifying candidates in commercials within thirty days of a primary contest or
sixty days of a general election.41 In regulatory terms, issue ads are not given
the same protections under federal law as campaign advertisements. Stations
are not required to sell or air issue ads, and because a station can choose
which, if any, issue ads it will run, the station assumes legal responsibility
for the content of the ads that it airs.42
recuse themselves because of their relationships with parties being investigated in the case.
Ed Pilkington, Because Scott Walker Asked, GUARDIAN (Sept.14, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2016/sep/14/john-doe-files-scottwalker-corporate-cash-american-politics; see also Dee J. Hall, Justices Face Questions as
‘John Doe’ Probe Lands in Supreme Court, WIS. ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2014), http://host.madison.
com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/justices-face-questions-as-john-doe-probe-lands-insupreme/article_b082257c-3b2d-5ac9-b7ee-63bc64286beb.html.
37. Grant of Petition for Review, Three Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, No.
013AP2504-2508-W (Wis. Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 2017), http://media.jrn.com/documents/2013AP
2504and2014AP296and2014AP417.pdf.
38. 47 U.S.C. § 315 et seq. (2012).
39. Id. § 315(2)(b).
40. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3) (2012) (originally enacted as Communications Act of 1934,
2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)).
41. Id.
42. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2012).
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Assuming a broadcast radio or television station is willing to sell issue
advertising, it will typically make a decision to carry issue ads at a prespecified rate, and will then publish a rate card that identifies the prices for
issue advertising sales. This information will be available, along with a list
of advertisers buying issue ads, within a station’s public file.43 Radio and
television broadcasters are required by law to maintain political advertising
information in their public files for a period of two years.44 As public file
data on political advertising includes pricing information, typically stations
will remove material periodically to keep information in line with the twoyear requirement and to remove proprietary information on advertising
rates.45 Even though the data within a station’s public file is relatively easy
to access,46 these databases can be challenging to navigate without some
broadcast industry knowledge and/or previous experience with them. Professor Terry is a former radio producer with significant experience in handling station public files, having been in charge of regulatory compliance
duties during his professional career. Our previous research was developed
using a unique archive of public file data from a cluster of radio stations
based in Milwaukee, WI, that we were able to access through professional
connections.47
For this research, we follow the lines of our earlier research, expanding
our attention to contemporary public file data on the non-candidate political
advertising as it relates to judicial races and candidates that ran on local television stations in Arkansas and Wisconsin ahead of the statewide Spring
elections in 2016. The use of public file data presents a complete picture of
the spending and running of political advertising; therefore, it is possible to
directly examine the spending of the candidates and outside groups in judicial elections.
IV. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD
The majority’s holding in Citizens United made assumptions about the
effects of corporate money (on corruption, influence and advertising) without considering empirical evidence. The Court then chose not to hear arguments in American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock,48 instead issuing a
per curiam decision reversing a Montana supreme court decision upholding
43. Id. § 315(e).
44. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3527(e)(5) (2017).
45. 47 U.S.C. § 315(e)(3).
46. See Public Inspection Files, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, https://publicfiles.fcc.gov/
(last visited Sept. 11, 2017). For television stations, a database of each station’s public file is
now online and available through the FCC’s website.
47. See supra note 19.
48. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 567 U.S. 516, 516 (2012) (per curiam).
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the state’s campaign finance statute, citing the Citizens United decision.49
The arguments in American Tradition Partnership would have included
historical and empirical data on the effects of corporate political spending in
that state.50
We renew our premise that empirical data provides the best opportunity
to assess the decision in Citizens United without political or ideological bias.
We continue to argue that to ignore the available empirical evidence is a
mistake, no matter where the data takes the argument. Past research has
demonstrated a correlation between direct contributions to justices and favorable rulings.51 Spending on behalf of (friendly) judicial candidates, especially in lower—turnout spring elections, like the statewide judicial races in
Arkansas and Wisconsin, has the potential to have more influence on a voter
than similar spending in larger political campaigns. With an incentive to
“stack the bench,” for example, industry groups opposed to environmental
or workplace regulations can support anti-regulation candidates, potentially
spending unlimited amounts of money to advertise on their behalf; far more
than any judicial candidate would spend individually. With a demonstrable
history of state supreme court justices unwilling to recuse themselves from
cases on ethical grounds,52 corporations, lobbies, and other groups that know
pending legislation, legal liabilities, or regulations will end up under judicial
review could view spending money on issue advertising as a practical, effective investment in influencing the candidate to rule in their favor. This premise was recognized by Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Caperton.
For this paper, we are interested in developing data that compared the
campaign spending by the judicial candidates to the money spent by outside
groups on advertising in the races. Relying on Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
Caperton,53 we set out to assess which groups, if any, may have had a “disproportionate influence” on the elections in either state.
To develop this analysis, we are interested in the number of issue ads
related to the judicial elections in each state, the number of those ads that
mention a candidate in the judicial election, whether those mentions are related to a positive endorsement or negative attack, and the total spending
amount.
49. Id.
50. See Jeff Wiltse, The Origins of Montana’s Corrupt Practices Act: A More Complete
History, 73 MONT. L. REV. (2013) (containing a history of the Montana Corrupt Practices
Act).
51. Terry & Bard, supra note 21.
52. Wisconsin Supreme Court Justices Tend to Favor Attorney Donors, supra note 22.
53. “The inquiry, centers on the contribution’s relative size in comparison to the total
amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the
apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009).
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On the surface, Wisconsin and Arkansas might appear to be an odd
combination of states for a comparison study of judicial advertising. With
our previous research geographically tied both to our archive and our physical location, we assumed the difference in the states would provide an interesting contrast as an empirical test. Surprisingly, the states actually had
more in common than we had initially anticipated.
Before 2016, both
Arkansas and Wisconsin had experienced a blitz of issue ads in statewide
judicial elections. Wisconsin’s experience with judicial race issue ads started shortly after the Citizens United decision with a race in 2011.54 Arkansas’s first taste came in the 2014 judicial election, where an outside advertiser, The Law Enforcement Alliance of America, ran a large quantity of
attack issue ads in the Wynne-Cullen election.55
A complete list of commercial television broadcast stations was assembled for each state, and then the FCC’s online public file database was
searched by call letter for each station. Inside of the public file of each station, the political tabs for 2015 and 2016 were examined. Data on advertising by the official campaign of the candidates in each state as well as the
advertising by outside groups in the judicial campaign was collected and
coded.
V.

RESULTS

There was a large volume of issue advertising in both states leading up
to the statewide spring elections. In Arkansas, we identified a total of 2,627
television ads that were run related to the 2016 statewide judicial election,
representing a total spending of $1,069,369. Of these totals, issue advertising represented 1,386 spots, which was 52.8 percent of the total volume, and
$585,268, which was 54.4 percent of the total spent. Notably, while outside
advertising exceeded the spending of all of the official candidates combined,
our data demonstrated only one issue advertiser that was active in the election cycle, the Judicial Crisis Network, an advocacy group based in Washington, D.C. that was supporting Dan Kemp.
In Wisconsin, we saw another active cycle of issue advertising related
to a statewide judicial race. In total, 9,725 advertisements were run, representing $2,454,164.65 in spending. Issue advertising represented 4,004 of
the spots, making up 41 percent of the total volume, and totaled $1,685,370,
which was 68 percent of the total amount spent on the race. In Wisconsin,
two advertisers bought issue ads. The Wisconsin Alliance for Reform organization ran 3,339 advertisements, which made up 83 percent of all issue ad54. See Milwaukee Radio, supra note 19.
55. See Eugene Kiely, Mudslinging in Arkansas Judicial Race, FACTCHECK.ORG (May
15, 2014), http://www.factcheck.org/2014/05/mudslinging-in-arkansas-judicial-race/.
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verting in the race and 34 percent of all of the advertisements related to the
election, and the group spent $1,326,220.65, which made up 78 percent of
issue ad spending and 54 percent of total spending in the race; all to support
the conservative incumbent, Rebecca Bradley. The Greater Wisconsin
Committee ran 665 ads, which was 17 percent of issue advertising and 7
percent of all election-related advertising, spending $359,150, which was 22
percent of issue ad spending, and 14 percent of all spending in the race,
which supported the challenger, Joanne Kloppenburg.
VI.

DISCUSSION

Ultimately, the center of our research is based on the contention that
courts should look at the empirical evidence of changes in issue advertising
when considering the balance between free speech and regulating political
contributions. On this point, there can no longer be any debate that the Citizens United decision has radically altered the landscape for political advertising. While we remain skeptical of the outcomes of the decision as they
relate to political races, the current research we have completed has given us
significant concerns about the future of an impartial justice system.
Wisconsin and Arkansas are, in many ways, very different states. They
sit in different regions of the country, with different economic standing and
industries, and have different population demographics. Wisconsin has nearly double the number of residents of Arkansas. Despite the differences between the states, our data demonstrates that the states share some common
post-Citizens United outcomes in election-related spending on statewide
judicial races in 2016. In Arkansas, the last two state supreme court races
have been dominated by just one group purchasing issue ads. As a result, a
well-funded, but otherwise apparently unconnected, group from outside of
the state bought and ran a large quantity of attack ads in order to influence
the race. With limited local ties, questions should be asked about the actual
interests represented by an issue group like the Judicial Crisis Network,
based in Washington, D.C., that outspent and ran more advertisements than
all of the candidates combined.
Likewise, in Wisconsin, where issue groups have been fighting an onair advertising war over judicial elections since 2011, and have outspent the
candidates by substantial margins in each of the statewide judicial elections
since Citizens United, questions linger about the intents of the various organizations spending large sums of money. Presumably, the goal is to influence policy in the state. While the diversity of the groups in Wisconsin running the issue advertising has been reduced, the message has not changed.
Like Arkansas, none of the judicial election advertising we examined was in
the form of positive support for a candidate. Almost universally, the issue
advertising comprises attack ads. Negative ads have become a form of judi-
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cial-election currency since Citizens United, and that currency is being invested with increasing frequency.
While conservative-leaning judicial candidates appear to be benefiting
the most from issue advertising, there seems to be another underlying
thread. According to our dataset, none of the groups identified in this 2016
election study were running ads that attacked candidates on their perceived
judicial stances on contemporary or controversial social issues. In fact, a key
element of ads attacking Courtney Goodson in Arkansas was her opposition
to, and decision to overturn, the state’s tort reform law. While we have not
empirically shown why this issue was featured by the advertisers, our research has found media reporting that suggests the groups supporting conservative candidates in both statewide judicial elections are drawing financial resources from a common network of donors.56 In fact, in both states,
the groups running the advertising appear to be funded primarily by industry
groups, which then use the issue groups as “fronts” to control the discussions about the candidates.57 This tactic has been performed openly by proindustry groups in Wisconsin in earlier judicial elections. In 2016, just one
group, which had not run a single advertisement before this election, was
running attack ads against the more liberal candidate Kloppenburg, supporting the incumbent Bradley who was perceived to be more pro-business.58
Logically, a $500,000 covert investment in a judicial election could be
money well spent by an industry if a favorable candidate is put on, or remains on, the bench before a potentially high-dollar liability or expensive
regulation case is going to be heard. In both states, as the issue groups run
more ads and far outspend the actual candidates, it provides an opportunity
to apply Justice Kennedy’s inquiry from Caperton. Problematically, as the
issue advertising is being conducted by outside groups on behalf of industries or individuals, there is limited disclosure of the actual parties trying to
influence races. As a result, there is virtually no way to ascertain the actual
source of the political speech or the intent of the speaker in the issue ads.
The absence of meaningful accountability logically creates a near-perfect
environment for potential corruption.
56. Peter Overby, Viveca Novak & Robert Maguire, Secret Persuasion: How Big Campaign Donors Stay Anonymous, NAT’L PUB. RADIO: MORNING EDITION (Nov. 6, 2013),
http://www.npr.org/2013/11/06/243022966/secret-persuasion-how-big-campaign-donorsstay-anonymous.
57. Peter Overby, Viveca Novak & Robert Maguire, Wellspring’s Flow: Dark Money
Outfit Helped Fuel Groups on Political Front Lines, NAT’L PUB. RADIO: MORNING EDITION
(Nov. 5, 2013). https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/11/wellsprings-flow/.
58. Molly Beck, With Rebecca Bradley, Conservatives Increase Their Majority on the
Supreme Court, WIS. ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2016), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-andpolitics/with-rebecca-bradley-conservatives-increase-their-majority-on-thesupreme/article_1a51d9bd-430b-587d-ac39-42228cdb66c5.html.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The data examined in this study empirically establishes a set pattern for
the 2016 judicial races in Arkansas and Wisconsin. In both cases, the overwhelming majority of advertisements and money spent on advertising came
from a very small group of outside groups rather than the campaigns themselves. Further, knowledge of the identity of the parties funding the advertising is limited, as is their motives. While we cannot empirically say why the
groups opted to expend hundreds of thousands of dollars on state judicial
races, we can say that a rational actor would do so only if that actor expected some kind of return on that investment. With one or two groups seeking to play an outsize role in placing or keeping a judge in a position to positively rule in the groups’ favor, it seems that the situations in Arkansas and
Wisconsin have edged close to, if not firmly within, Justice Kennedy’s
“probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker” that
“is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”59
The impartiality of the nation’s judges lies at the heart of our legal system and our democracy. The data in this study indicates that this impartiality
is under threat by the kind of unlimited issue advertising legalized by Citizens United. At the very least in the arena of judicial elections, the Court
should use empirical research to calibrate its balance between free speech
and the regulation of political advertising so that it is clear that no group can
buy the allegiance of a judge.

59. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 877 (2009) (quoting Winthrop v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).

